This paper examines the effects of the use of outstanding bank loans, loans from nonbank financial intermediaries, and unused bank lines of credit on a firm's cash holdings, equity risk, and investment. Firms with more outstanding bank loans have more cash holdings and investment and a lower equity risk. Firms with more loans from non-bank financial intermediaries have a lower equity risk and less investment. Moreover, firms with more unused lines of credit have less cash holding, a lower equity risk, and more investment. I also find that bigger and older firms and firms with more growth opportunities have more unused lines than outstanding private debt. These results suggest that not only the amount of debt but also the sources of debt matter in a firm's financial decisions.
I. Introduction
Bank loans and other privately placed debt are an important source of long-term funds for U.S. corporations. The Federal Reserve System reports that $1,159 billion in bank loans and $1,124 billion in other loans were outstanding in non-financial corporations at the end of 2002 1 . These amounts are roughly equal to these corporations' public debt.
Bank loans and other privately placed debt are also special 2 . The existence of bank loans and other private debt can serve as a signal of a borrower's credit worthiness to the capital market because financial intermediaries have more information than most other investors.
Banks and other financial intermediaries also monitor borrowers. Better-informed than most other lenders, financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage in enforcing debt contracts, and the concentrated ownership of private debt also mitigates the free-rider problem in monitoring.
Several studies have examined the special functions of financial intermediaries from the perspective of the valuation impact of private financing. For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) and James (1987) find a positive stock abnormal return at the announcement of bank credit agreements. Lummer and McConnell (1989) also find that the positive stock abnormal return is associated with favorable bank loan renewals. However, current empirical studies haven't examined whether the uniqueness of private financing influences a firm's financial decisions.
The finance literature has also overlooked one important type of private debt -lines of 2 See Campbell and Kracaw (1980) , Fama (1985) , and Diamond (1984) . 3 On May 4, 2004, Nikkei (Tokyo) reports.
documented the use of lines of credit in U.S firms or the differences between term loans and lines of credit.
Private financing can affect a firm's financial decisions beyond the effect of leverage because of financial intermediaries' monitoring function. First, borrowing from financial intermediaries can decrease a firm's optimal cash holdings and increase its investment through the reduction of information asymmetry. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that since information asymmetries increase a firm's cost of external financing, firms with large information asymmetries will hold more cash or have to underinvest when their internally generated cash flows are not sufficient to finance all positive net-present-value projects.
Since financial intermediaries can evaluate a borrower's project quality with more information than most other investors, private borrowing can reduce a firm's need to hold cash and mitigate the underinvestment problem.
Second, borrowing from financial intermediaries can decrease a firm's asset risk and investment through the control of asset substitution. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that levered firms have a higher asset risk than unlevered firms since shareholders in a levered firm have an incentive to substitute risky assets for safe assets. Diamond (1989) shows that monitoring from financial intermediaries and reputation effects constrain asset substitution and reduce asset risk in levered firms. Diamond (1989) also implies that firms borrowing more from financial intermediaries invest less in risky, negative net-present-value projects than other firms when these firms have the same investment opportunities.
Different types of private financing can have distinctive effects. Fama (1985) and Nakamura (1993) argue that the deposit relationships associated with commercial bank borrowing facilitate the production of information. These deposit relationships, however, are not present with non-bank loans. If information collected through deposit relationships helps banks screen and monitor their borrowers, borrowing from banks will have stronger effects on cash holdings, asset risk, and investment than borrowing from non-bank financial intermediaries.
Unused bank lines of credit and outstanding private borrowing can also have different effects. Financial intermediaries' incentive to monitor may be weaker when there is unused line of credit than when there are outstanding loans since no lending has occurred.
Financial intermediaries' incentive to monitor may also be stronger when providing unused lines of credit because borrowers may use lines of credit to invest in risky projects. The differences in financial intermediaries' incentive to monitor can lead unused lines of credit and outstanding loans to affect a firm's financial decisions differently.
I conduct several sets of tests to examine the effects of outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, and unused bank lines of credit on a firm's financial decisions. I use a unique dataset that is composed of data hand collected from Moody's industrial manuals and data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The sample has 961 firms and 3,399 firm-year observations over the 1996-2000 period. First, I examine the extent to which a firm's private borrowing changes its cash holdings. Second, I investigate the effect of private borrowing on a firm's equity risk. Third, I look directly at the relationship between the amount of investment a firm makes and its private borrowing. With different regression specifications, these tests show the differences between private debt and public debt, bank debt and non-bank private debt, and outstanding private debt and unused bank lines of credit.
The sources of debt have a significant effect on a firm's financial decisions beyond the effect of leverage. Firms with more outstanding bank loans have a lower equity risk and more cash holdings and investment. Firms with more outstanding non-bank private debt have a lower equity risk and less investment. In addition, firms with more unused bank lines of credit have less cash holding, a lower equity risk, and more investment.
These results have the following implications. First, private borrowing differs substantially from public borrowing. Private borrowing can mitigate both or at least one of the information asymmetry and asset substitution problems. Second, firm-bank deposit relationships facilitate the production of information. Both outstanding bank loans and unused bank lines of credit increase investment through the reduction of information asymmetry, while non-bank private debt does not. These results are consistent with the argument that banks gain more information about firms through the firm-bank deposit relationships. Third, banks have a strong incentive to monitor when firms have unused bank lines of credit. Providing unused bank lines of credit to firms can be riskier for banks than providing outstanding bank loans, since firms can use the funds for risky projects.
However, unused bank lines of credit still reduce a firm's equity risk the same as outstanding private does, which suggests that banks screen and monitor borrowers very intensively when they provide lines of credit to firms.
When investigating the effects of private borrowing on a firm's financial decisions, I
must deal with the endogeneity issue that arises from the selection of which firms borrow from banks or non-bank financial intermediaries. Any observed effect may be a result of reverse causality as firms receiving bank and non-bank private debt financing may have little information asymmetry and moral hazard ex-ante. To understand the firm selfselection process, I first examine the determinants of private borrowing. The use of outstanding bank loans and non-bank private debt decreases with a firm's size, age, and growth opportunities, while the amount of unused lines of credit increases with growth opportunities. In addition, I find that bigger and older firms and firms with more growth opportunities have more unused lines of credit than outstanding private borrowing. The determinants of private borrowing are used as instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity problem.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops testable hypotheses. Section III introduces the sample and data. Section IV examines the determinants of private borrowing. Section V reports the effects of private borrowing on a firm's financial decisions. Section VI concludes.
II. Hypotheses
Banks and other financial intermediaries have two functions that public investors do not have. First, they have an information function. Several theoretical papers, e.g. Campbell and Kracaw (1980 ), Fama (1985 , and Boyd and Prescott (1986) , argue that financial intermediaries have more information than other capital market participants and their lending decisions reveal a borrower's credit worthiness. Second, financial intermediaries have a monitoring function. Diamond (1984) shows that the costly monitoring function is delegated to financial intermediaries since the concentrated ownership of private debt avoids the free-rider problem in monitoring and enforcing debt contracts and minimizes the cost to produce information useful to resolve the problem.
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Information asymmetry hypothesis
The information asymmetry hypothesis, based on Myers and Majluf (1984) , predicts that firms with more private debt hold less cash and invest more than other firms. Based on Fama (1985) , the information asymmetry hypothesis also predicts that firms borrowing from banks hold less cash and invest more than firms borrowing from non-bank financial intermediaries.
Information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors increases the cost of external financing and causes underinvestment. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that since only managers know the quality of the project, the yield on borrowings will reflect only the average project quality. If the market were to place an average value greater than average cost on projects, the potential supply of low quality projects may be very large, since managers could foist these upon the uninformed market and make a sure profit. But this argues that the low average project quality leads to the consequence that even projects that are known by managers to merit financing cannot be undertaken due to the high cost of capital. Myers and Majluf (1984) consider a firm that must issue external securities to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment project. When uninformed investors in the capital market undervalue the firm's security, the external financing cost is so high that the firm will underinvest. Their paper suggests that because of information asymmetry, firms have the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds and to underinvest when internally generated cash flows are insufficient to finance all positive net-present-value projects.
Financial intermediaries have an advantage over public investors in collecting information. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) argue that financial intermediaries emerge as information producers because the production of information, the protection of confidentiality, the provision of transactions services, as well as other intermediary services, are naturally complimentary activities. Fama (1985) draws a distinction between outside debt and inside debt. He claims that bank loans are inside debt as banks can gain access to information from a borrower's decision-making process that would not otherwise be publicly available. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) , Boyd and Prescott (1986) , and intermediaries are willing to lend the firm at a lower interest rate that reflects the quality of the project accurately than the interest rate charged by public investors, at which these projects would be foregone 4 . As a result, borrowing from financial intermediaries alleviates the underinvestment problem. The reduction of adverse selection through private borrowing also releases the pressure for firms from holding a lot of cash. Since private debt can be borrowed at an interest rate closely reflecting a project's quality, firms can rely less on internally generated cash flows to finance their positive NPV projects. Instead, they can distribute cash to shareholders through dividends and stock repurchase.
Alternative to the negative effect of private financing on cash holdings predicted by the information asymmetry hypothesis, private borrowing can also have a positive effect on a firm's cash holdings. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that private debt usually has more restrictive covenants in restricting dividend payout, various financial ratios, and additional debt issues than public debt does. Such restrictions limit a borrower's financial flexibility.
In a survey of 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that financial flexibility is a firm's top concern when issuing debt. Therefore a competing argument for the information asymmetry hypothesis is that firms, in order to minimize the negative consequences of debt covenants on their investments and other operations, will hold more cash as they borrow more private debt.
The difference between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries can affect the production of information. Fama (1985) and Nakamura (1993) argue that the deposit relationships associated with commercial bank borrowing facilitate the information production and monitoring, and these relationships are not present with non-bank private borrowing. However, the evidence on whether banks and non-bank financial intermediaries have the same functions are mixed. Studying private placement markets, Carey, Prowse, Rhea, and Udell (1993) show that firms borrowing from non-bank financial intermediaries have less information asymmetry than firms borrowing from banks. James (1987) finds a significant negative stock price response at the announcement of private placements used to repay bank loans. However, James and Wier (1990), in contrast, find no difference between bank debt and non-bank debt in certifying firms in their initial public equity offerings.
Bank borrowings can have a stronger effect in reducing cash holdings and increasing investment than non-bank private borrowings. If deposit relationships provide more private information, such as daily cash flows, than information provided by a firm when it seeks financing from financial intermediaries, banks will have a comparative advantage in screening potential borrowers over non-bank financial intermediaries. Therefore, borrowing from banks can reduce a firm's cash holdings and increase its investment more than borrowing from non-bank financial intermediaries.
Moral hazard hypothesis
The moral hazard hypothesis, which is based on Diamond (1989) , predicts that firms borrowing more from financial intermediaries have a lower asset risk and less investment than other levered firms. Moreover, based on the assumption that deposit relationships between banks and firms provide more information to facilitate monitoring, the moral hazard hypothesis also predicts that firms borrowing from banks have a lower asset risk and less investment than firms borrowing from non-bank financing intermediaries.
One moral hazard problem between debt holders and shareholders is asset substitution, which arises from the adverse incentives of limited liability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that shareholders in a levered firm have an incentive to undertake riskier projects because they have unbounded upside potential for future cash flows but face only bounded downside potential due to limited liability. Viewing a levered firm's equity as a call option on the firm's underlying assets, Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that substituting assets of high risk for those of low risk can increase the volatility of the firm's assets, thus increase the share value. However, asset substitution decreases the value of debt.
The moral hazard problem can be partially prevented by writing restrictive debt covenants, which increases the costs of asset substitution to shareholders. For instance, Smith and Warner (1979) argue that restrictions on sale, lease or disposal of any substantial part of its properties and assets; and on the collateral of assets, limit a firm's ability to engage in asset substitution. Private lenders, having a comparative advantage in writing and enforcing bond covenants, can effectively reduce the agency costs due to moral hazard. However, since a debt contract cannot specify all contingencies, covenants can, only to some extent, solve the moral hazard problem.
Private borrowings can also constrain asset substitution in a levered firm through monitoring. Diamond (1989) shows that monitoring from financial intermediaries and the cost of losing reputation jointly eliminate the conflict of interests between borrowers and lenders about the choice of risk in investment decisions. His model suggests that firms borrowing from financial intermediaries engage in less asset substitution and have a lower asset risk than firms borrowing from the public debt market.
Through the control of asset substitution, borrowing from financial intermediaries also affects the amount of investment a firm will make. Assume that there are two firms, firm A and B. They have the same investment-opportunity sets, which consist of both safe, positive net-present-value projects and risky, negative net-present-value projects. Firm A borrows from financial intermediaries, while firm B borrows from the public debt market.
Financial intermediaries perform interim monitoring after they lend money to firm A and beyond what is revealed by their borrowers, banks are more likely to detect asset substitution than non-bank financial intermediaries. As a result, firms borrowing from banks will have a lower asset risk and less investment than firms borrowing from non-bank financing intermediaries.
Summary of hypotheses
Focusing on different stages of financial intermediaries' monitoring function, the information asymmetry hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis have the following predictions.
5 The prediction that firms with more private debt have less investment is based on the assumption that monitoring from financial intermediaries does not change firms' incentive to forego positive NPV projects (the debt overhang problem in Myers (1977) ). Because of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors on potential projects that a firm can undertake, it's almost impossible for financial intermediaries to force the firm to invest in all positive NPV projects. Based on the assumption that the deposit relationships between firms and banks facilitate the production of information, bank borrowing will have stronger effects than non-bank private borrowing on cash holdings, asset risk, and investment.
III. Sample and Data Description

Sample
My dataset merges the COMPUSTAT annual industrial file, the COMPUSTAT research Table 1 presents the summary statistics for variables used in this study.
Dependent variables
There are three dependent variables: cash holdings, equity risk, and investment. I measure cash holdings by the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the value of total assets. I use the standard deviation of daily common stock returns over each year to measure equity risk. Equity risk does not only incorporate asset risk but also a firm's financial risk. Investment is measured by net investment at t=1 divided by the book value of fixed assets in year 0. Net investment is defined as capital expenditure minus depreciation.
Private borrowings
There Banks' incentive to monitor can also be stronger when committing lines of credit. Liu (2004) reports that firms hold lines of credit for emergency external capital needs. As a result, unused lines of credit give firms the chance to invest in risky projects. To prevent asset substitution, banks will monitor intensively.
Firms hold a significant amount of unused lines of credit. The average amount of unused bank lines of credit held by the sample firms represents 7.1% of these firms' total assets.
406 firms have data for each year over the 5-year sample period. 
Control variables
Following Barclay and Smith (1995) , I use the market-to-book ratio, which is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets, as a proxy for the present value of a firm's growth opportunities. Growth options increase a firm's market value relative to its book value since intangible assets such as growth options are not included in the book value of assets. I estimate the market value of assets as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The market-tobook ratio is included in the regressions of cash holdings and investment. Since firms with a high market-to-book ratio are more likely to be cash constrained, they will hold more cash. Investment should also increase with the market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio has a mean of 1.842.
The natural log of sales, which are stated in 1996 dollars, measures firm size. Firm size is controlled for in the regressions of cash holdings and equity risk. Cash holding/total assets is expected to decrease with a firm's size. Because of the fixed cost of outside funding, big firms with a larger issue size will, on average, find it more cost-effective to issue new securities. Having a lower cost of cash shortage, they will have a lower ratio of cash holding to total assets than small firms. Big firms with more diversified operations will also have a lower asset risk than small firms. A firm's debt level also affects its cash holdings, equity risk, and investment. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argue that leverage is a proxy for the degree to which the capital markets monitor a firm and that managers in firms with low debt are likely to hold more cash for their own objectives. The leverage ratio also affects a firm's equity risk by introducing financial risk to the firm. Moreover, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) find that leverage negatively affects the investments made by firms whose growth opportunities are either not recognized by the capital markets or are not sufficiently valuable to overcome the effects of their debt overhang. Therefore, leverage, measured by the ratio of the book value of short-term and long-term debt to the book value of total assets, is included in the regressions of cash holdings, equity risk, and investment.
Leverage has a mean of 11.7%.
Cash flow is measured by earnings before interest and depreciation, but after taxes, scaled by total assets. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988 ), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991 ), Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996 and others show that investment is related to the availability of internal funds. Since cash flow net of interest expense partially captures the effects of leverage, I use a cash flow measure gross of interest as in Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) .
Firms with higher research and development expenses (R&D) will hold more liquid assets. When information asymmetries are important, a cash flow shortfall forces firms to contract investment. Since investment in research and development is subject to a larger degree of information asymmetry than other types of investment, it's more difficult to get external financing. As a consequence, firms with more R&D expense will hold more cash.
Net working capital, measured by working capital minus cash scaled by total assets, is a substitute for cash. Firms may choose to insure themselves against losses by holding liquid assets besides cash.
Lagged capital expenditure scaled by fixed assets can be related to a firm's current investment. For example, some investment projects take several years to complete, so there can be a positive correlation between lagged capital expenditure and current investment.
On the contrary, it's unlikely for firms that just invested in machinery last period to invest it again this period, so lagged capital expenditure can be negatively correlated with current investment.
IV. Determinants of Private Borrowing
In investigating the effects of private borrowing on a firm's financial decisions, it is essential to address the endogeneity of the selection of who borrows from financial intermediaries in the first place. Even if bank debt or non-bank private debt has no effect on cash holdings, asset risk or investment, we may observe a significant relation between these variables if firms that receive bank and non-bank private debt financing are those that are less likely to have the information asymmetry and asset substitution problem. For example, suppose that monitoring does not affect a firm's asset risk and that financial intermediaries lend money only to firms that are less likely to substitute risky assets for safe assets. The selection of which firms borrow from financial intermediaries will result in a negative correlation between asset risk and private borrowing and lead to the conclusion that private borrowing controls asset substitution through monitoring. Therefore, unless controlling for the endogeneity of private debt financing, we cannot make any assertion on the causality between the use of private debt and financial decisions for any significant correlation observed between them. In this section, I first examine the determinants of the use of outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, and unused bank lines of credit.
These determinants are used as instrumental variables in later regressions to control for the endogeneity problem.
Previous studies suggest that the use of private debt should be related to flotation costs of new debt issues, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. Issuing public debt costs more than issuing private debt since public issues are associated with investment banker fees, filing and legal fees, and other transaction costs 7 . As a result, small firms whose debt issue size is generally small will use more private debt than big firms. Firms with large information asymmetry and severe moral hazard problems will also use more private debt than other firms. As discussed in section II, financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage in collecting information and monitoring over other investors, therefore borrowing from financial intermediaries can reduce the debt contract costs arising from information asymmetry and moral hazard.
The following regression is used to analyze the cross-sectional differences in the use of private debt.
In equation (1), PB is private borrowing -outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, or unused lines of credit. X it are dependent variables, which include a firm's size, age, market-to-book ratio, fixed-asset ratio, and residual standard deviation. Tobit regressions are used to estimate the coefficients since private debt data are censored 8 . Each variable is measured at its time-series mean within each firm.
Size is used as a proxy for flotation costs. Since the size of debt issues is positively correlated with a firm's size, the use of private debt will be negatively related to a firm's size. Size is also a proxy for information asymmetry, since bigger firms are better known by investors than small firms.
Age and the residual standard deviation are used as proxies for information asymmetry.
The age of a firm is defined as the number of years since its incorporation. The data on the year of a firm's incorporation is obtained from Moody's Industrial Manual. The residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regressions of daily stock returns in the previous year on the market returns. Bhagat et al. (1985) , Blackwell et al. (1990 ), Dierkens (1991 ), and Krishnaswami et al. (1999 , argue that there is large information asymmetry when managers have a relatively large amount of valuerelevant, firm-specific information that is not shared by the market. Until this information is revealed to the market, investors bear some firm-specific uncertainty. If investors in the market and the manager of a firm are equally well informed about the market-wide (systematic) factors influencing firm value, residual volatility in a firm's stock returns may be used as a proxy for information asymmetry about firm-specific information.
The market-to-book ratio and fixed-asset ratio are used as proxies for the moral hazard problems. Barclay and Smith (1995) argue that firms with more growth opportunities have more severe incentive problems since shareholders of high growth firms can substitute riskier projects for safe ones more easily. Therefore, firms with a higher market-to-book ratio and a lower fixed-asset ratio are expected to use more private debt to reduce debt contract costs.
The use of different types of private debt
The use of outstanding bank loans decreases with a firm's size, age, market-to-book ratio, and fixed-asset ratio, and increases with the residual standard deviation. In the first regression reported in Table 4 , the coefficient on size is -0.130, and the coefficient on age is -0.202. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The residual standard deviation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. These results are consistent with the flotation argument and the information asymmetry argument. The coefficients on the market-to-book ratio and the fixed-asset ratio are negative, but not statistically significant. The negative coefficient on the market-to-book ratio suggests that there is a hold-up problem associated with bank borrowing. Rajan (1992) argues that information acquired by banks as a part of an ongoing relationship can create an information monopoly or a hold-up problem that it's costly for a borrower to switch lenders. He also argues that such problems are likely to be particularly acute for firms with valuable investment opportunities.
The use of non-bank private debt decreases with a firm's size, age, market-to-book ratio, and fixed-asset ratio, and increases with the residual standard deviation. However, only the coefficients on size and age are statistically different from zero at the 10% level.
The holding of unused lines of credit decreases with a firm's size, age, fixed-asset ratio, and residual standard deviation, and increases with the market-to-book ratio. Coefficients on all variables except the fixed-asset ratio are statistically different from zero at the conventional level. Different from the use of outstanding private debt, the amount of unused lines of credit increases with the market-to-book ratio. The amount of unused lines of credit also decreases with the residual standard deviation, which suggests that banks are more likely to commit lines of credit to firms with a lower risk to reduce the chance of asset substitution.
Differences in the use of different types of private borrowing
Regressions in Table 5 examine the differences among the use of different types of private borrowing. Regressions in Table 4 show that there are differences in the determinants of outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, and unused lines of credit, however we cannot make formal statistical inferences on the differences based on those results. Regressions in Table 5 There are some differences between the use of outstanding bank loans and non-bank private debt, but the differences are not statistically significant. The first regression reported in Table 5 shows that bigger and younger firms and firms with a higher market-tobook ratio, fixed-asset ratio, and residual standard deviation use more outstanding bank loans than non-bank private debt. However, none of the coefficients in the regression is statistically different from zero.
Bigger and older firms and firms with a higher market-to-book ratio, and a lower fixedasset ratio and residual standard deviation have more unused lines of credit relative to outstanding private debt. In the second regression in Table 5 , the coefficient on size is 0.043, statistically significant at the 1% level; and the coefficient on age is 0.040, statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is 0.085, statistically significant at the 1% level. Liu (2004) report that firms may hold unused lines of credit to keep down their borrowings while ensuring that they can quickly secure funds in an emergency, such as a sudden deterioration in the issuance environment for corporate bonds. Since it's more costly for firms with good investment opportunities to underinvest, firms with a high market-to-book ratio hold more unused lines of credit than firms with a low market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio may also represent the quality of the management in a firm. Then the positive relation between the unused lines of credit and the market-to-book ratio also implies that banks are more willing to commit to lines of credit to firms of a better quality. Banks are unable to evaluate borrowers' project quality before they commit lines of credit; therefore banks are more likely to provide lines of credit to firms with a good management team in order to ensure the project quality. The coefficients on the fixed-asset ratio and the residual standard deviation are negative but not statistically different from zero.
My findings suggest that firms use different types of debt in different stages of their life cycle. When firms are small and young, they borrow mainly from banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. As firms grow bigger and older, they still borrow from banks, however they are more likely to hold lines of credit for their investment opportunities in case of an emergency than have outstanding bank loans. After firms have established reputation in the financial market, they switch from financial intermediaries to public investors when they want to raise external capital.
The determinants of the use of outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, and unused lines of credit will be used as instrumental variables in later tests to control for the endogeneity issue associated with private financing, as long as they do not belong to the regressions of cash holdings, equity risk, or investment themselves.
V. Effects of Private Borrowing
Cash holdings and private borrowing
Regression models
To investigate the effects of private borrowing on cash holdings, I extend the regression used in Opler et al. (1999) to include different types of private debt as testing variables.
For each test, I have three regression specifications.
CH it = α + β 1 *BL it + β 1 *NBPD it + β 1 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (2) CH it = α + β 1 *TBD it + β 2 *NBPD it + X it *Γ+ ε it
CH it = α + β 1 *OPD it + β 2 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (4)
In equation (2), (3), and (4), CH is cash holding/total assets; BL is outstanding bank loans; NBPD is the non-bank private debt; ULC is unused lines of credit; TBD is total bank debt; OPD is total outstanding private debt; and X is the vector of control variables that include a firm's market-to-book ratio, size, leverage ratio, cash flow, research and development expenses, and net working capital.
In equation (2), outstanding bank loans, non-bank private debt, and unused bank lines of credit are included in the regression separately. This specification assumes that three types of private borrowing have different effects.
In equation (3), non-bank private debt and all bank debt, which is the sum of outstanding bank loans and unused bank lines of credit, are included as testing variables. This specification assumes that the sources of debt matter in the cash holding decisions while whether lending has taken place does not.
In equation (4), unused lines of credit and outstanding private debt, which is the sum of outstanding bank loans and non-bank private debt, are included as dependent variables.
This last specification emphasizes whether lending has been committed but not the sources of funds.
Each variable is measured at its time-series mean within each firm. There are two reasons for measuring these variables at the time-series mean. First, the predictions from the information asymmetry hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis are about differences across firms. For example, the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that firms with more unused bank lines of credit invest more than other firms since bank borrowing reduces information asymmetry. In exploiting the time-series differences, we may observe that firms draw from the line of credit to make investment. The decrease in the unused bank lines of credit and the increase in investment lead to a negative correlation between them. Therefore, the time-series analysis is not appropriate to test the information asymmetry and moral hazard hypotheses. The cross-sectional regressions preserve the dispersion across firms, but exploit no time-series variation in the observations. Second, using cross-sectional data avoids the weak instrumental variable problem.
Instrumental variables that are not correlated with the error terms in the regressions are difficult to identify since most financial decisions are interrelated. When excluded exogenous variables do not have a strong explanatory power for measures of private borrowings (the weak instrumental variable problem), the bias in the OLS estimators is exacerbated in the two-stage estimation and the coefficient estimates are not consistent.
The determinants of private borrowing identified in the previous section have a stronger power in explaining the cross-sectional differences in the use of private debt than in explaining the cross-sectional and time-series differences 9 . Therefore, using cross-sectional regressions also has a better fit in the two-stage estimations with instrumental variables.
I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the coefficients. There are other estimation methods compatible with the instrumental-variable approach, such as the two-stage least square estimation and the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. However, only GMM can correct for the heteroskedasticity in the error terms -a common issue when using cross-sectional data. Moreover, using GMM enables me to test the validation of the model specification when the number of excluded exogenous variables is more than the number of endogenous variables. The over-identification test tests whether the regression model is correctly specified by examining the correlation between the excluded exogenous variables and the regression error terms. Table 6 presents the correlation analysis of the variables used in the regressions of cash holdings. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, cash holdings have a negative and statistically significant coefficient with all three private debt variablesoutstanding bank debt, non-bank private debt, and unused lines of credit. Cash holdings also have a positive correlation with a firm's market-to-book ratio and research and development expense, and a negative correlation with a firm's size, leverage ratio, cash flow, and net working capital. All these correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Correlation analysis
Regression results
The first three regressions in Table 7 show that using outstanding bank loans, non-bank 
Equity risk and private borrowing
Regression model
The following regressions of equity risk test the moral hazard hypothesis that borrowing from financial intermediaries constrains firms from asset substitution and reduces firms' asset risk.
ER it = α + β 1 *BL it + β 1 *NBPD it + β 1 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (5) ER it = α + β 1 *TBD it + β 2 *NBPD it + X it *Γ+ ε it (6) ER it = α + β 1 *OPD it + β 2 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (7) Equity risk, the dependent variable used in the above regressions, does not only incorporate a firm's asset risk of but also its financial risk. X it is the vector of control variables that include a firm's size and leverage ratio which controls for the financial risk of the firm. All variables are measured at their time-series means within each firm. GMM estimators are used. Table 8 reports the correlation analysis of the determinants of equity risk. Equity risk is positively correlated with outstanding private debt. The correlation between equity risk and bank debt is 0.101, statistically significant at the 1% level; and the correlation between equity risk and non-bank private debt is 0.082, statistically significant at the 5% level.
Correlation analysis
These positive correlations are contradictory to the moral hazard hypothesis. Moreover, equity risk and unused lines of credit have a correlation of -0.134, statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, equity risk is negatively correlated with a firm's size and positively correlated with a firm's leverage ratio.
Regression results
Outstanding borrowing reduces a firm's equity risk. Without controlling for the endogeneity problem, coefficients on all outstanding private debt variables in the first three regressions are negative. However, none of them is statistically different from zero. When the fixed asset ratio, residual standard deviation, market-to-book ratio, and size 2 are used as instrumental variables 10 in the last three regressions, coefficients on bank debt, non-bank private debt, and all outstanding private debt are still negative and become statistically significant. The regressions also show that bigger firms and less levered firms have a lower equity risk.
Having unused bank lines of credit also decreases a firm's equity risk as outstanding bank loans do. In Table 9 , the coefficients on unused lines of credit in the first and third regressions are -0.017, and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on all bank debt in the second regression is -0.010, also statistically significant at the 1% level.
In the regressions controlling for the endogeneity problem, the coefficients on the unused lines of credit remain negative and statistically significant.
The result implies that banks monitor borrowers intensively when there are unused bank lines of credit. Unused bank lines of credit can be subject to a more severe asset substitution problem than outstanding private debt is, since banks are unable to evaluate the project quality before committing lines of credit. However, holding used lines of credit still reduces a firm's equity risk as outstanding private debt does. Therefore, banks are very careful in screening and monitoring firms when providing lines of credit.
Investment and private borrowing
Regression model
Since the information asymmetry hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis have opposite predictions on the impact of private borrowing on a firm's investment, the following regressions test which of the information and monitoring function of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries is more prominent.
I it = α + β 1 *BL it + β 1 *NBPD it + β 1 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (8) I it = α + β 1 *TBD it + β 2 *NBPD it + X it *Γ+ ε it (9) I it = α + β 1 *OPD it + β 2 *ULC it + X it *Γ+ ε it (10)
In equation (8), (9), and (10), I it is investment; X it is the vector of control variables that include cash flow, the market-to-book ratio, lagged capital expenditure, and the leverage ratio. All variables are measured at their time-series means within each firm. GMM estimators are used. with a firm's cash flows, market-to-book ratio, and lagged capital expenditure and a negative correlation with the leverage ratio. Table 11 shows that borrowing from banks increases a firm's investment while borrowing from non-bank financial intermediaries decreases a firm's investment. In the first three regressions, the coefficients on outstanding bank debt and non-bank private debt are negative and the coefficients on unused lines of credit are positive. However, when instrumental variables are used to control for the endogeneity problem, the coefficients on outstanding bank loans and unused lines of credit are positive and the coefficients on nonbank private debt are negative. For example, in regression 5, the coefficient on non-bank private debt is -0.442 and the coefficient on all bank private debt is 0.652, both statistically significant at the 10% level. A firm's investment also increases significantly with its lastperiod capital expenditure. These findings suggest that bank borrowing reduces information asymmetry and increases investment while non-bank private borrowing constrains asset substitution and decreases investment.
Correlation analysis
Regression results
Results in the regressions of cash holdings, equity risk, and investment altogether suggest that banks are unique in reducing information asymmetries. The use of both outstanding bank loans and unused lines of credit increases investment through the reduction of information asymmetry and decreases a firm's equity risk through monitoring.
Unused lines of credit also decrease a firm's cash holdings by reducing information asymmetry. But the use of non-bank private debt only decreases a firm's equity risk and investment through monitoring.
Results are also robust in a simultaneous system of equations. Financial decisions on cash holdings, equity risk, and investment can be interrelated. Running regressions of cash holdings, equity risk, and investment separately cannot capture such interrelations.
Previous findings still hold when I run the regressions of cash holdings, equity risk, investment, leverage, outstanding bank debt, non-bank private debt, and unused lines of credit in a simultaneous system of equations.
VI. Conclusion
This paper shows that not only the amount of debt, but also the sources of debt matter in a firm's financial decisions. I conduct several independent sets of tests to show the impacts of outstanding bank loans, loans from non-bank financial intermediaries, and unused bank lines of credit on a firm's cash holdings, equity risk, and investment. In the context of above tests, this paper shows the differences between private debt and public debt, bank loans and loans from non-bank financial intermediaries, and outstanding private borrowing and unused lines of credit.
Different types of private debt have distinctive effects on a firm's cash holdings, equity risk, and investment. Firms with more outstanding bank loans have a lower equity risk and more cash holdings and investment. Firms with more non-bank private debt have a lower equity risk and less investment. Moreover, firms with more unused bank lines of credit have lower cash holding and equity risk but more investment.
In order to investigate the effects of private borrowing on a firm's financial decisions, I
also examine the determinants of private borrowing to deal with the endogeneity problem of private financing. I find that the use of bank loans and non-bank private debt decreases with a firm's size, age, market-to-book ratio, and fixed-asset ratio and increases with the residual standard deviation. The amount of unused bank lines of credit decreases with a firm's size, age, fixed-asset ratio, and residual standard deviation and increases with the market-to-book ratio. Moreover, I find that as firms grow bigger and older, they are more likely to have a line of credit with banks for their investment opportunities than have outstanding bank loans.
The results suggest that financial intermediaries have comparative advantages in collecting information and monitoring over public investors and the uniqueness of private financing affects a firm's financial decisions. The use of private debt can mitigate one or both of the adverse selection and asset substitution problems. In addition, different types of private debt are different. Banks are better at reducing information asymmetry than nonbank financial intermediaries. Unused line of credit is the only type of private debt that serves as a substitute for cash. The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. There are 961 unique firms and 3,399 firm-year observations. Cash holding is cash and other marketable securities divided by total assets. Equity risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Investment is net capital expenditures for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets at the end of year 0. All private debt is the ratio of the sum of bank loans and nonbank private debt to total long-term debt. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total long-term debt. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total long-term debt. Unused line of credit is scaled by total assets. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Size is measured by log of sales, which are stated in 1996 dollars. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Cash flow is earnings before interest expense and depreciation, scaled by total assets. R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets. Net working capital is working capital net of cash, scaled by total assets. Fixed-asset ratio equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year. Age is the number of years since a firm's incorporation. Cash holdings, all private debt, bank debt, nonbank private debt, market-to-book, leverage, cash flow, R&D, net working capital, fixed-asset ratio, and residual standard deviation are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Table 4 The use of different types of private debt
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are a sample of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP and Moody's industrial manuals. Bank debt is the ratio of bank debt to total assets. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other longterm privately placed debt to total assets. Unused lines of credit are scaled by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Age is the number of years since a firm's incorporation. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Fixed-asset ratio equals the ratio of the value of fixed assets to the value of total assets. Residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year. All variables are measured at the firm-level mean. 
Table 5 Differences in the use of different types of private debt
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are a sample of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP and Moody's industrial manuals. Outstanding private debt is the sum of the amount of outstanding bank loans and loans from non-bank financial intermediaries. Outstanding and unused borrowing from financial intermediaries is the sum of outstanding private debt and unused lines of credit. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Age is the number of years since a firm's incorporation. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Fixed-asset ratio equals the ratio of the value of fixed assets to the value of total assets. Residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year. All variables are measured at the firm-level mean. 
Table 6 Correlation analysis of the determinants of cash holdings
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Cash is a firm's cash holdings divided by its total assets. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total long-term debt. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total long-term debt. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of sales. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Cash flow is earnings before interest and depreciation, scaled by total assets. R&D is the research and development expense divided by total assets. Net working capital is working capital net of cash, scaled by total assets. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean. P-values are in parentheses.
Cash
Bank debt The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Cash is a firm's cash holdings divided by its total assets. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total assets. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total assets. Unused line of credit is the ratio of unused bank line of credit to total assets. All bank debt is the sum of bank debt and unused line of credit. All outstanding private debt is the sum of bank debt and non-bank private debt. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Size is measured by ln(sales). Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Cash flow is earnings before interest and depreciation, scaled by total assets. R&D is the research and development expense divided by total assets. Net working capital is working capital net of cash, scaled by total assets. All variables are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean.
Ln(age+1), the fixed-asset ratio, size 2 , and the residual standard deviation are used as instrumental variables, when endogeneity is controlled for. Age is the number of years since a firm's incorporation. The fixed-asset ratio equals the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year.
Coefficients are estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM). P-values reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 8 Correlation analysis of the determinants of equity risk
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Equity risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total long-term debt. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total longterm debt. Size is measured by the ln(sales). Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Bank debt, non-bank private debt, all private debt, and leverage are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean. P-values are in parentheses. 
Table 9 Equity risk and unused bank lines of credit
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Equity risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total assets. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total assets. Unused line of credit is the ratio of unused bank line of credit to total assets. All bank debt is the sum of bank debt and unused line of credit. All outstanding private debt is the sum of bank debt and non-bank private debt. Size is measured by the ln(sales). Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Bank debt, non-bank private debt, all private debt, and leverage are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean.
The fixed-asset ratio, the residual standard deviation, size 2 , and the market-to-book ratio are used as instrumental variables, when endogeneity is controlled for. The fixed-asset ratio is the ratio of the book value of fixed assets to the book value of total assets. The residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year. The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets.
Table 10 Correlation analysis of the determinants of investment
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Investment is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets at the end of year 0. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total long-term debt. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total long-term debt. Cash flow is earnings before depreciation and interest expense. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Capital expenditure is the one-year lag of the ratio of capital expenditure to fixed assets. Bank debt, non-bank private debt, market-to-book, and leverage are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean. P-values are in parentheses.
Investment
Bank debt 
Table 11 Investment and unused bank lines of credit
The sample period is 1996-2000. Included firms are manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) who are trading in NYSE and AMEX. All data are obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Moody's industrial manuals. Investment is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets at the end of year 0. Bank debt is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total assets. Non-bank private debt is the ratio of other long-term privately placed debt to total assets. Unused line of credit is the ratio of unused bank line of credit to total assets. All bank debt is the sum of bank debt and unused line of credit. All outstanding private debt is the sum of bank debt and non-bank private debt. Cash flow is earnings before interest expense and depreciation. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Capital expenditure is the one-year lag of the ratio of capital expenditure to fixed assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. Bank debt, non-bank private debt, all private debt, market-to-book, and leverage are measured at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each variable is measured at its firm-level time-series mean.
Ln(sales), ln(age+1), the fixed-asset ratio, size 2 , and the residual standard deviation are used as instrumental variables, when endogeneity is controlled for. Age is the number of years since a firm's incorporation. The fixed-asset ratio is the ratio of the book value of fixed assets to the book value of total assets. The residual standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression using daily returns from the previous year.
